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Abstract 
Robert Brandom's Making It Explicit is a very complex, difficult, extensive and 
misunderstood book. One of its main objectives is to explain normativity from a 
pragmatist point of view, basically, the thesis that the norms are instituted by attitudes 
of rational beings engaged in social and inferentially articulated practices. In this 
paper, my goal is to develop the structure of the book regarding specifically the 
"normative pragmatics", showing the concepts and vocabulary Brandom introduces to 
account normativity. Then, I present three modes at which we can understand the 
normative practices and discuss the problems and solutions we find in each mode. I 
conclude with a short analysis on the main criticism made to the book.  
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Resumo 
Making It Explicit, de Robert Brandom, é um livro complexo, difícil, extenso e mal 
compreendido. Um de seus principais objetivos é explicar a normatividade de um ponto 
de vista pragmático, basicamente, a tese de que as normas são instituídas pelas atitudes 
de seres racionais envolvidos em práticas sociais inferencialmente articuladas. Neste 
artigo, meu objetivo é desenvolver a estrutura do livro considerando especificamente a 
"pragmática normativa", mostrando os conceitos e o vocabulário que Brandom introduz 
para explicar a normatividade. Então, apresento os três modos pelos quais podemos 
compreender as práticas normativas e discuto os problemas e as soluções que 
encontramos em cada um destes modos. Concluo com uma análise sobre as principais 
críticas feitas ao livro. 
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Normative status, normative attitudes, and sanctions 
In Making It Explicit, Robert Brandom accepts the normative characterization of 
rational practices appealing to Kant, Hegel, Sellars, and Wittgenstein. Giving special 
attention to Wittgenstein, Brandom tries to show that the Philosophical Investigations 
analyzes and rejects two possible explanations on norms, which Brandom calls 
"regulism" and "regularism" – also analyzed in Sellars's Some Reflections on Language 
Games. Regulism is the idea that a performance is considered correct according to its 
relation or reference to some explicit rule determining what is correct. According to 
Brandom, Philosophical Investigations rejects regulism because it generates a regress 
argument (the well-known Wittgenstein's regress of interpretations). Then, Brandom's 
conclusion is the necessity of a "pragmatist conception of norms", that is, "a notion of 
primitive correctnesses of performance implicit in practice that precede and are 
presupposed by their explicit formulation in rules and principles" (BRANDOM: 1994, 
p. 21). What kind of explanation could respect that? A possibility is the regularism: to 
take norms just as the description of regularities. But according to Brandom, 
Wittgenstein shows that the regularist always can justify any performance appealing to 
some norm, and in doing so it cannot offer a good distinction between what is 
considered correct and incorrect, between what is done or should be done. Thus, it is 
necessary a pragmatist explanation that maintains the normative dimension of practices. 
In other words, Brandom thinks that the Philosophical Investigations teaches us that to 
explain normativity is to offer an answer to this question: "In what sense can norms 
(proprieties, correctnesses) be implicit in a practice?" (BRANDOM: 1994, p. 25). That 
is one of the central purposes in Making It Explicit.  
So, Brandom turns to Kant. According to Brandom (1994, 2007, 2009), one of 
the most important ideas from Kant is that rational beings recognize the authority of 
rules and follow them because of that recognition. They treat some practices identifying 
the normative dimension and grasping the boundaries delimited by this dimension, then 
choosing freely to act within these limits. This is to say that rational beings have 
normative attitudes. A natural attitude toward a rule is only a behavioral response that 
can be described in a non-normative vocabulary – for instance, by any empirical 
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psychology – but a rational attitude includes the normative significance of that response. 
Joining this idea and Hegel's "normative functionalism", Brandom proposes that the 
authority of rules comes from attitudes of mutual recognition of rules. The "normative 
attitude" involves attributing a prescriptive dimension, recognizing certain practices as 
involving an opposition better described by pairs of terms like "correct" and "incorrect", 
"right" and "wrong", "appropriate" and "inappropriate", and so on. Then, it is an attitude 
of attributing (to oneself or to any other normative being) a normative commitment, 
treating the target of such attribution as committed. Brandom calls this commitment a 
"normative status". Thereby, a normative attitude is an attitude of attributing a 
normative status. To understand a practice as normative depends on recognition and 
attribution of such status in social environments. So, to act conforming norms is not 
sufficient to be following norms, because normative practices require the recognition of 
the normative aspect of the practical application of norms. Considering that, Brandom 
suggests that normative attitudes explain the normativity of practices because these 
attitudes institute normative status, the normative attitudes control the adoption and 
modification of commitments. Putting it differently: a (normative) commitment emerges 
from attribution of commitment, and the result is a set of commitments as products of 
doings. There are not commitments before people act attributing commitments in 
normative contexts. Normative beings impose the normative on the non-normative 
using the ability they have of acting recognizing commitments in situations they 
consider as having proprieties or correctness. Lastly, Brandom adds a third component 
to this strategy. He believes that the Enlightenment juridical tradition offered a form to 
explain the relation between normative attitudes and status invoking the concept of 
sanction. Roughly, the account is formulated in terms of reward and punishment: 
someone treats a practice as correct by offering a reward, and treats a practice as 
incorrect punishing it. In the course of time, the process molds the behaviors and 
imposes norms. Inspired by that, Brandom's objective is to explain normative status in 
terms of normative attitudes, and normative attitudes in terms of positive and negative 
sanctions. We could call that account a "sanction-based normative pragmatics", but 
Brandom prefers "retributive approach to the normative".  
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Assertional practice and scorekeeping 
Using a normative vocabulary, Brandom explains norms in terms of inferentially 
articulated commitments that characterize a performance as correct or incorrect because 
normative beings recognize and attribute each other such commitments in their 
practices, and they can sanction inadequate behaviors. This is the first level one can 
describe normative practices and it is the basis of the scorekeeping model that Making It 
Explicit develops. 
To start, Brandom (1994, 2002) introduces a model of language-use explaining 
what anyone is doing when using the language, specifically making an assertion – 
according to him, the basic block of language games which expresses the undertaking of 
commitments. To claim a sentence as an assertion is to undertake a commitment to the 
correctness of inference from its circumstances of appropriate employment to its 
appropriate consequences of application. Put it differently, Brandom's assertional model 
specifies the circumstances under which one is committed to claim sentences – other 
commitments authorizing the original commitment – and the consequences of being 
committed to claim sentences – other commitments authorized by original commitment. 
Then, an assertional practice requires inferential commitments to the justification and 
consequences of the sentences. Since commitments are instituted because the agents 
have a capacity of attributing commitments, one can think the attitudes of attributing 
commitments according to the model of antecedents and consequences, in social 
practices. To attribute a commitment is to be able to master the inferential proprieties 
involving justifications and consequences of that specific commitment, holistically 
considered. For example, if a community accepts the assertion "The Ocean is blue" then 
it must accept the consequential assertion "The Ocean is colored". This is not a habit or 
a dispositional behavior, but it is practicable once linguistic agents have an internal 
mastery of which conceptual commitments are valid in their community. They are able 
to control and manage commitments, relating them to expected consequences and 
recognizing the responsibility of justifying them. Additionally, this inferential structure 
permits to accommodate the concept of sanction, because to undertake a commitment 
authorizes (offers the right to) a further sanction; for example, if a justification is not 
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offered or is not good, the sanction could be justly applied. Then, sanctions are an 
important part of that structure of commitments being attributed and recognized by 
social agents: they are a sort of commitment too, seen as consequences of other 
commitments unfulfilled.  
Commitments are inferentially articulated and depend on recognition of 
consequences and conditions of applications. The attitudes of normative beings institute 
norms because they show what those beings are disposed to accept and recognize as 
commitments, in practices of their community. So, linguistic beings can use those 
commitments to keep track of the normative game, to keep track of what is considered 
correct or incorrect within the game. Using such ideas, Brandom develops the 
normative assertional game as a "deontic scorekeeping", a model where the players 
undertake and attribute commitments when adopting normative attitudes. The 
scorekeeping is the practice of treating oneself or an interlocutor as having inferentially 
articulated commitments governing his practices. To be a good scorekeeper is to know 
how to attribute and recognize commitments, regarding the proprieties from community. 
Reductionism and circularity 
On Brandom's view, the normativity requires an account of norms implicit in the 
practices. To explain normative status in terms of normative attitudes and sanctions 
avoids regress (because norms are implicit in actions and do not need to be explicit), but 
this is exactly where we can find the most important critics of Brandom's conception.  
The standard criticism insists that to explain normative status in terms of 
attitudes and sanctions reduces norms to dispositions or regularities. In his defense, 
Brandom sustains that to explain normative attitudes from application of sanctions 
would be reductionist, but there is no reason to think this is the unique way. 
Reductionism is optional, he says, because it is possible to understand sanctions as a 
normative significance. "External sanctions" affect and model behavior in a reductionist 
view, but "internal sanctions" are normative, they affect just those creatures sensitive to 
norms. The scorekeeping model concentrates especially in internal sanctions, which are 
totally inside a normative dimension. They are part of the structure of norms which 
normative beings respect, they are sanctions within the system regulating the behaviors 
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not as dispositions to act, but because they are internalized and added to the "web" of 
commitments – rights and duties – of linguistic beings. However, that solution seems to 
introduce a risky obstacle: circularity. Normative sanctions explain normative attitudes, 
and normative attitudes explain normative status. Once it is legitimate to think possible 
a wrong application of normative sanctions, a sanction can be necessary to explain 
another sanction. Then, Brandom's next step is to suggest that internal sanctions are 
anchored in external sanctions (specified in non-normative terms), but this solution 
reintroduces the reductionism (I will return to these issues further on). Even so, 
considering this conceptual methodological apparatus, and despite the temptation to 
consider Brandom's project as reductionist, Making It Explicit considers it a 
"phenomenalism about norms".  
On the broadly phenomenalist line about norms that will be defended here, norms are in an 
important sense in the eye of the beholder, so that one cannot address the question of what 
implicit norms are, independently of the question of what it is to acknowledge them in 
practice. The direction of explanation to be pursued here first offers an account of the 
practical attitude of taking something to be correcting-to-a-practice, and then explains the 
status of being correct-according-to-a-practice by appeal to those attitudes (Brandom, 1994, 
p. 25). 
The phenomenalism about norms explains how taking a practice as correct 
appeals to the attitudes of taking a practice as correct. What is correct (what should be 
done) is instituted by the attitudes of taking the practices as correct. So, to understand 
what is correct we must pay attention to what people take as correct in their attitudes. 
Then, Brandom is explaining what it is to take a normative commitment, not what a 
normative commitment is. Once the phenomenalism about norms generates 
reductionism, Brandom needs to reformulate it. This is not a big problem because he 
says, just in the beginning of Making It Explicit, that normativity cannot be wholly 
understood until the end of the book – until the conclusion, indeed. Therefore, we 
should take the introduction of phenomenalism about norms as an incomplete and 
transient argument. Then, in the first part of the book, readers only know that social 
attitudes institutes norms, described in a non-reductionist vocabulary. 
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Normative phenomenalism and original interpretation 
Norms are instituted by attitudes of acknowledging practices as correctly 
attributing commitments to agents engaged in such practices. Rather than to explain 
what normative status are, the strategy is to explain the attitude of attributing them, 
exemplified by a game called scorekeeping. Scorekeepers produce and consume 
inferential articulate contents, as assertions, through which they can make their 
normative moves (to attribute and acknowledge commitments). One can describe 
permissions, obligations, incompatibilities and so on in the assertional practice in terms 
of normative status, as a "net" of commitments and entitlements determining the valid 
transitions to the conceptual contents. This is the first approach to normativity 
(phenomenalism about norms), the first level one can describe normative practices, and 
its principal threat is reductionism. To avoid it, Brandom makes an important upgrade, 
introducing the second level of understanding of the normativity: the "normative 
phenomenalism".  
The (normative) phenomenalist strategy that has been pursued throughout is to understand 
normative statuses in terms of normative attitudes – in terms of (proprieties of) taking to be 
correct or incorrect. This strategy dictates two questions concerning proprieties of 
scorekeeping practice. First (apropos of phenomenalism about norms), what must one be 
doing in order to count as taking a community to be engaging in implicitly normative social 
practices – in particular in deontic-status-instituting, conceptual-content-conferring 
discursive scorekeeping practices? Second (apropos of its being a normative 
phenomenalism), what is it about the actual performances, dispositions, and regularities 
exhibited by an interacting group of sentient creatures that makes it correct or appropriate 
to adopt that attitude – to interpret their behavior by attributing those implicitly normative 
discursive practices? (Brandom, 1994, p. 628). 
The phenomenalism about norms considers the norms taken correctly in 
practice, but the normative phenomenalism considers the norms correctly taken as 
correct in practices. This difference shows the distinction between attitudes governed by 
norms and norms governing the attitudes governed by norms. For example, if 'p' entails 
'q', anyone acknowledging commitment to 'p' could not acknowledge commitment to 'q', 
but ought to. So, commitments are not identified by how anyone actually keeps score in 
practices, but with correct scorekeeping. Normative phenomenalism considers the 
commitments governing the attitudes, that is, commitments controlling the adoption and 
alteration of practical attitudes occurring in the scorekeeping: how scorekeepers are 
obliged or committed to adopt and alter their attitudes during that game. Then, to 
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evaluate a practice normatively is to evaluate attitudes regarding commitments, it is to 
analyze how correct is to adopt such attitudes. Thus, if phenomenalism about norms is 
described in terms of attitudes, the normative phenomenalism includes commitments to 
such attitudes. In causal order really are agents dealing with each other in a way 
described as the scorekeeping, but attitudes of scorekeepers already include norms. So, 
normative phenomenalism resolves the threat of reductionism because it is developed 
on attitudes governed by normative status. However, circularity is a risk again (norms 
are necessary to describe those attitudes which institute and maintain norms), and the 
relation between normative specifications of practices and non-normative specifications 
of behavior remains untouched.  
We can see that solution to the reductionism as an update from phenomenalism 
about norms to normative phenomenalism, a proposal that does not consider the 
attitudes actually made, but the commitments controlling the correct adoption of such 
attitudes. Brandom could stop there, but he does a last and crucial movement: to explain 
normativity in terms of how the practitioners of assertional game as interpreters in the 
scorekeeping model, that is, when it is appropriate to interpret a community as 
constituted by linguistic agents attributing and recognizing inferential articulate 
commitments to each other. This is the third level of the description on normativity.  
Now, Brandom applies the same strategy used from phenomenalism about norms 
to normative phenomenalism. He does not explain actual interpretation, but correct 
interpretation. There are commitments governing the capacity to correctly apply an 
interpretation within scorekeeping, licensing the interpreter to undertake commitments 
to the practices being interpreted. In correct (or normative) interpretation, the interpreter 
can take the other scorekeepers as engaged in practices corresponding to the 
inferentially articulated contents of normative status that articulate the social practices 
of their community. Adopting the correct interpretation, the interpreter takes the 
interlocutor being interpreted as committed, according to proprieties that correspond to 
the inferential contents of the commitments. So, to correctly interpret a community is 
taking it as bounded by implicit proprieties that articulate the conceptual contents of 
their practices. Considering that, one can specify the structure an interpretation of the 
activities of the community must have for their members to treat each other as 
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exhibiting normative behaviors, in terms of commitments. This is why Brandom 
describes scorekeeping: basically, to be a good scorekeeper it is to be a good interpreter.  
The attitudes to attribute norms explain norms, but these attitudes are normative 
since the beginning of normative beings' social lives. When they are born, they are not 
following any norms, but they already have a capacity to become a normative being. 
When they start to speak the first language and to act in non-linguistic but normative 
situations, they start to perform their normative ability. This is to say that normative 
creatures start to learn how to do what they naturally can do: to attribute and recognize 
norms, to be a scorekeeper. Then, from the start, they learn how to make a normative 
interpretation. (In fact, they never really know what is not to be a normative being, 
because they are always inside a normative social perspective). 
In this paper, I am not concerned with details about what correct and incorrect 
interpretations are. However, the idea can be investigated examining the relation 
between someone interpreting the members of his own community (an internal 
interpreter) or from outside (an external interpreter). An internal interpreter can 
explicitly attribute commitments, but he does not need (or cannot) attribute explicitly 
normative attitudes to the agents being interpreted. An external interpreter explicitly 
attributes both. So, the difference is that the internal interpreter just implicitly takes or 
treats someone as committed, insofar the external interpreter explicitly does it. Despite 
the difference between external and internal, the fundamental distinction is between 
explicit and implicit interpretations. One who can make commitments explicit, and to 
treat other as having commitments implicit in its intelligent behavior, can adopt a 
"simple" interpretation. One who adopts the simple interpretation, and additionally can 
make explicit its normative attitudes toward the commitments, can adopt "original" 
interpretation. Then, the original interpreter must be capable of saying what he is doing, 
making explicit the inferential proprieties implicit governing the ascriptions of attitudes. 
Both simple and original interpreters consider the practitioners being interpreted as 
engaging in the same interpretive stance the interpreter does, doing exactly what the 
interpreter is doing (attributing normative attitudes), but simple interpreters does it in an 
implicit mode and original interpreters as an explicit mode.  
Considering simple and original interpretational analysis to normative practices, 
the difference between phenomenalism about norms and normative phenomenalism is 
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the type of attitude adopted to attribute commitments. In the phenomenalism about 
norms, the interpreter keeps a simplified sort of score by attributing commitments to 
which the subject is taken to acknowledge only implicitly in its behavior. The normative 
phenomenalism analyzes when it is appropriate to adopt an interpretation attributing to 
it a set of explicitly commitments. Then, the crucial difference between simple and 
original interpretation is just an expressive matter. Using resources from logical 
vocabulary, the original interpreter is able to express the articulation of his normative 
attitudes. So, it is possible to see the external interpretation as a special (more complex) 
case of the internal interpretation: to be capable of distinguishing the commitments 
being acknowledged and undertaken by agents, and attributing those commitments 
explicitly.  
When an external interpreter recognizes his capacity to make explicit, he 
achieves an explicit interpretive equilibrium, and the explanatory gap between simple 
and original interpretation disappears: both interpretations coincide. Thus, the collapse 
of interpretations shows the difference between creatures able or enable to express the 
implicitly articulation of their practices, logical or rational creatures. The external 
interpreter is also an internal interpreter, for this reason, commitments that would be 
available only to external interpreters are also available to internal interpreter. When 
logical beings dominate the expressive resources of their language, they can theorize 
about their ascriptions of commitments, and doing that their normative relations become 
topics for justification and discussion. They can make explicit to themselves as 
normative beings. Thus, original interpreters do not theorize about norms that they 
analyze in external communities (observing animals, for example), but about their own 
norms, their practices containing those norms. So, they can recognize themselves as a 
community, demarcating the boundaries of their conceptual, normative, and expressive 
space of reasons. According to Brandom, we (human beings) can do that, projecting our 
interpretation within our own community. We interpret our practices and undertake 
commitments to correctness of our performances. So, the appropriate interpretation 
needs to be according to those proprieties governing our practices. If the interpreter 
interprets interlocutors as bounded by a different set of norms, he is offering a different 
interpretation, distinct from the one the community is taking.  
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Criticisms  
It is possible to describe norms in three ways. In the initial level, the normative 
appears as normative status inferentially articulated. However, to talk of normative 
status is talking about normative attitudes (normative status are only used to identify 
and individualize attitudes) then, in the next level, norms appears as normative status 
governing the adoption and alteration of practical attitudes. In the highest level, norms 
govern the normative interpretation: one who attributes norms interprets other as 
bounded by the same normative status (and perhaps uses logical locutions to make 
explicit the interpretation). Second and third levels require being appropriately restricted 
by commitments that are not in causal order, so, if it is impossible to describe 
normativity in these levels exclusively in non-normative terms then the discussion 
remains about how norms are instituted. 
In the phenomenalism about norms, the norms are in the eyes of their beholders, 
the external interpreters describing the scorekeeping. Once the external interpreter is an 
internal interpreter, the norms that external interpreters are describing are the active 
norms in their own practices, described by them from within, using logical capacities. 
We do that. As logical beings, we can make explicit the commitments implicit in our 
normative practices. Everything we have to theorize is our commitments and its 
connection with our practices in interpretational contexts. This is clearly a pragmatist 
account that does not offer an ontological answer to normativity. Brandom explains 
what we do as normative creatures, and how to understand and talk about the 
normativity associated with our practices. So, we must see Making It Explicit as 
offering a very complex development of the Sellars's "logical space of reasons", as a 
conceptual, normative, and logical space guiding rational beings. In any case, there are 
four main categories of criticisms on Brandom's account of normativity: reductionism, 
circularity, idealism, and frustrated readers. 
The most common critic accuses Making It Explicit of reductionist. Nonetheless, 
the normative phenomenalism resolves the problem because it is developed on attitudes 
governed by norms. Normative beings are within a normative space (their 
comprehension of the world and themselves is always normative). Norms bound them 
all the time, since they start to speak and live in a linguistic community. Thus, there is 
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no reductionism, it is almost the opposite. To explain the story of normative beings we 
need an irreducible normative vocabulary, fundamental because we cannot describe 
ourselves as normative beings without it. So, one can see that Making It Explicit 
account of normativity is circular. A manner to investigate this issue is thinking about 
norms being instituted – non-normative practices become normative. Some kinds of 
creatures are normative, they have an ability to treat themselves as bounded by norms. 
In a new situation (where there is no present norm), a normative being acts considering 
that the other normative beings will act in the same way he acts; he acts attributing to 
others the same capacity he has to engage in situations that can be identified as correct 
or incorrect. All normative beings do the same: they attribute correct behaviors to each 
other. In the course of time, these behaviors are being adjusted (refined), they are 
modified by interaction between scorekeepers to reflect the attitudes (attributions and 
acknowledgment) of the community, the norms (and not what someone takes as 
norms1). Thus, normative beings acknowledge those situations as normative, and 
acknowledge the objectivity of "norms" from the community, that is, the 
acknowledgment that norms outrun individual attitudes2. In that interpretation, Making 
It Explicit does not have circularity, because norms are instituted by attitudes made by 
creatures with certain normative capacities. Nonetheless, by opposition to reductionism 
and by extreme focus on normative dimension of rationality, Brandom has been accused 
of losing contact with the world. This does not happen because all the time he considers 
the external world. Scorekeepers apply concepts that are about the world because there 
is an objective sense of correctness that governs the conceptual application: "a sense of 
appropriateness that answers to the objects to which they are applied and to the world of 
facts comprising those objects" (BRANDOM: 1994, p. 594). Conceptual content is 
articulated by inferential relations that do not correspond to non-perspectival facts, but 
by "how the world is", "how things actually are". Although there are many scorekeepers' 
                                                             
1 In addition, if they are logical beings, they can modify their behaviors because can explicitly discuss 
about norms. 
2 The scorekeeping model includes relations between the commitments undertaken and attributed, the 
practice of treating oneself or others as having inferentially articulated normative status. To understand 
the correctness of a commitment is to go beyond the attitude of acknowledgement, reaching non-
perspectival articulation of commitments. This is to say that commitments generate incompatibilities 
and consequences that transcending a particular perspective. Thus, the objectivity of norms is the 
reflection of the perspectival distinction between undertaking and attributing commitments 
transcending individual attitudes, and every scorekeeper maintains a distinction between objective 
commitments and subjective attitude. 
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perspectives, there is just one world bearing how normative beings institute their norms. 
Then, what one really could reject is Brandom's explanation of the relation between 
world and norms (how the world participates of normative reign and how norms 
appear). Of course, this is a very important topic, but the main objective in Making It 
Explicit is to explain how to understand the normative practices. For this reason, 
Brandom frustrates readers looking for an explanation about the ontology, the origins of 
normativity (the complete process of institution of norms) or about the relation between 
the normative and the causal. Brandom does not answer these questions, his focus is on 
pragmatism about norms and its relations with rational and logical capacities. 
Conclusion 
According to Brandom, it is possible to describe normative practices by three 
forms. Initially, considering the game of giving and asking for reasons in terms of 
normative status and attitudes (phenomenalism about norms). Then, in terms of 
normative status governing normative attitudes (normative phenomenalism). The last 
level is in terms of interpretations according to the norms. To interpret a community as 
engaged in practices instituting norms is taking its members as adopting the normative 
interpretation toward each other, to interpret those members as bound by norms 
outrunning their individual dispositions to act. Thus, the interpreter uses the norms 
implicit in his own attitudes to specify explicitly how those norms extend beyond his 
own actual capacity to apply them correctly. This is compatible with interpreting other 
normative beings as answering to the same set of objective norms. So, when someone is 
correctly interpreting agents as scorekeepers is accepting both (interpreter and 
interpreted) share objective norms, and once the norms are perspectival and 
interpretative, the discursive practitioners can be engaged in explicit discussions of 
those practices in virtue of which they interpret each other. Then, Brandom is replacing 
the "intentional" interpretation with the capacity to be a scorekeeper, and that capacity 
cannot be described using a non-normative vocabulary. However, Making It Explicit is 
not concerned with origins of normativity, but just describing the game of giving and 
asking for reasons using a normative vocabulary in terms of commitments and 
attributing of commitments. His account is a rich model of rational practices 
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considering contents inferentially articulated by creatures able to recognize the 
normative dimension of their actions and language. 
The standard criticism insists that to explain normative status in terms of 
normative attitudes is to reduce the normative to the non-normative. Those who accuse 
Making It Explicit of reductionism do not grasp the difference between phenomenalism 
about norms and normative phenomenalism. Brandom focus on normative reign could 
suggest that the circularity is never overcome; consequently, we lose the world. Those 
who accuse Making It Explicit of circularity do not grasp the collapse of levels. 
Although Brandom is clearly not losing the world, he could offer more details about this 
issue. The other criticisms are just unsatisfied readers searching what is beyond 
Brandom's objectives (in that book, at least). He is not offering an accurate explanation 
about ontology or origins of normativity, or the relation between normative and causal 
reigns, but a sophisticated hypothesis about our normative practices, appealing to an 
interpretive stance. 
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